Archive for category: Liability Minute

What the Amendment to Rule 756(e) Means to You

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 756(e) was adopted at the urging of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) and requires private practice lawyers who don’t have professional liability insurance to undergo a four-hour, interactive self-assessment of risk.

 


Call us at 312-379-2000 for information on Rule 756(e) and how it applies to your practice.


Frequently Asked Questions:

 

Why has the Illinois Supreme Court added this requirement?

Rule 756(e) is part of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to adopt proactive management-based regulation (PMBR) a system designed to prevent ethical missteps and ensure a high-standard of professionalism. The Supreme Court encourages the purchase of malpractice insurance by all private practice law firms

All lawyers are encouraged to self-assess, but those who have not purchased malpractice insurance to protect their clients are required to participate.

To whom does Rule 756(e) apply?

It applies to Illinois private practice lawyers without malpractice insurance, with some exemptions.

Who is exempt from Rule 756(e)?

Lawyers who have professional liability insurance are exempt. Others include:

  • Lawyers serving in the U.S. Armed Forces, under Rule 756 (a) (2)redd
  • A justice, judge, associate judge or magistrate; or judicial law clerk, administrative assistant, secretary or assistant secretary to such a justice, judge, associate judge or magistrate (Rule 756 (a) (3))
  • Lawyers who are inactive (Rule 756 (a) (5))
  • Lawyers who are retired (Rule 756 (a) (6))
  • Lawyers who are inactive or retired and performing pro bono services (as per Rule 756 (k))

Does Rule 756(e) apply to in-house counsel, Assistant State’s Attorneys or Public Defenders?

The rule does not apply, provided the lawyer is not doing any private practice work for anyone besides the employer.

One exception would be where a lawyer has a limited outside practice for clients (e.g., they do house closings, estate planning on the side). If they have such an outside practice, and are not insured, then they do have to go through the ARDC’s PMBR process.

When does Rule 756(e) take effect?

The amended rule went into effect January 25, 2017. Beginning in 2018, lawyers who register with the ARDC and disclose that they do not have malpractice insurance will be required to complete an online self-assessment.

What will the ARDC Rule 756(e) self-assessment cover?

The free, four-hour assessment, administered by the ARDC, will include questions about how lawyers operate their practice. Lawyers taking it must demonstrate an engagement in learning about professional responsibility requirements for the operation of a law firm. Results of the self-assessment will be provided, along with resources to help in addressing any issues raised. The self-assessment is mandatory.

The ARDC hopes the PMBR process will be very user friendly. The modules are now being developed. They will range in duration from 15 to 45 minutes each. That means that a practitioner can do a half-hour here and there, or do an hour or two at any sitting.

How long will the self-assessment take to complete?

The self-assessment is a four-hour exercise; lawyers taking it will earn four hours of MCLE professional responsibility credit.

What is the deadline for completing the self-assessment?

Uninsured lawyers who are engaged in the practice of law representing private clients will have all of 2018 to take the self-assessment modules in whatever increment they choose.

What happens if a lawyer doesn’t complete the mandatory self-assessment?

Those who do not complete the self-assessment modules will not be able to register for the 2019 registration year. Once they complete the courses, they will be able to so register.

Will the content or results be made public?

All information related to the self-assessment will be confidential, except for the fact of its completion. The Illinois ARDC may report self-assessment data publicly in the aggregate.

Can the information shared in the Rule 756(e) self-assessment be used as evidence in disciplinary proceedings?

No.

How can I avoid completing the self-assessment?

Private practice lawyers who have malpractice insurance are not required to complete the self-assessment.

 


More information on Illinois Supreme Court Rule 756e

Rule 756(e) Provides Uninsured Lawyers an Important Wakeup Call on Risk
—  Kane County Bar Briefs, Sep 2017

Law Pulse: New rule requires uninsured lawyers to do self assessment
—  Illinois Bar Journal, March 2017

Amended supreme court rule requires uninsured lawyers to do self-assessment
—  Illinois Lawyer Now, February 28, 2017

The Supreme Court moves proactively on attorney malpractice insurance and liability issues
—  ISBA Bench & Bar Section Council Newsletter, February 2017

Attorneys without malpractice must do self-assessment to decrease risk, ARDC says
—  Cook County Record, February 2, 2017

Court rule adds online assessment
—  Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, January 30, 2017

Illinois Becomes First Jurisdiction to Adopt PMBR
—  Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Professionalism blog, January 30, 2017

Illinois Likely Set Trend For New Professional Conduct Training
—  Law360, January 27, 2017

Illinois Supreme Court adopts ‘proactive management-based regulation’
—  Illinois Lawyer Now, January 25, 2017


Supreme Court’s announcement

Full text of the Rule 756

Protection Reflection: The Supreme Court Rules Allow Partners To Limit Their Liability

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

The future ain’t what it used to be.
— Yogi Berra

Many lawyers are still unaware that effective July 1, 2003, our Supreme Court promulgated rules which conferred protection from professional liability in certain circumstances. Illinois Supreme Court Rules 721 and 722 allow lawyers in Illinois to protect themselves against vicarious liability for legal malpractice committed by other lawyers at their firm provided that the law firm (1) maintains one of the business forms enumerated by Rule 7211 and (2) maintains the minimum amount of malpractice insurance or other proof of financial responsibility required by Rule 722.

Conditions for Limited Liability Protection

While Rule 721 extends limited liability protection to non-Illinois licensed lawyers and entities who are shareholders, members, or partners of a law firm with an Illinois office, that limited liability protection is conditioned on at least one partner being a member of the Illinois bar. This provision requires a limited liability law firm in Illinois to have at least one partner who is a natural person licensed to practice law in Illinois. Further, an authorized limited liability entity may only practice law in Illinois or maintain an office in Illinois for that purpose after being issued a certificate of registration by the Illinois Supreme Court. A certificate of registration will continue in effect until it is suspended or revoked subject to annual renewal on or before January 31st of each year.

Finally, Rule 721 eliminated vicarious liability for legal malpractice committed by other lawyers at a limited liability law firm as long as the law firm maintains minimum insurance or proof of financial responsibility pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 722. To evidence proof of minimum insurance or financial responsibility, an authorized shareholder, member, or partner of a limited liability entity must provide an affidavit or a verification by certification under §1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure with each application for registration or renewal.

Minimum Insurance or Proof of Financial Responsibility

Rule 722 defines “minimum insurance” as “a professional liability insurance policy applicable to a limited liability entity, and any of its owners or employees, for wrongful conduct.” Minimum insurance must exist, “in one or more policies, with respect to claims asserted during an annual policy period due to alleged wrongful conduct occurring during the policy period and the previous six years.” The minimum amount of insurance is “$100,000 per claim and $250,000 annual aggregate, times the number of lawyers in the firm at the beginning of the annual policy period, provided that the firm’s insurance need not exceed $5,000,000 per claim and $10,000,000 annual aggregate.”

Alternatively, an Illinois law firm may enjoy limited liability status by submitting proof of financial responsibility. To do so, it must evidence funds equaling at least the minimum required annual aggregate for minimum insurance referenced above. Proof of such funds may be in any of the following forms: (1) deposit in trust or in bank escrow of cash, bank certificates of deposit, or United States Treasury obligations; (2) a bank letter of credit; or (3) a surety bond. These funds must be “specifically designated and segregated for the satisfaction of any judgments” against the law firm.

Rules 721 Has No Bearing on Individual Ethical Conduct

Rule 721(b) emphasizes that the Rule “does not diminish or change the obligation of each attorney engaged in the practice of law on behalf of the corporation, association, limited liability company, or registered limited liability partnership to conduct himself or herself in accordance with the standards of professional conduct applicable to attorneys licensed by [the Illinois Supreme Court].”

Personal Liability

Regardless of the business form, a lawyer will always be liable for his own acts or omissions arising from professional legal services. Additionally, a lawyer is liable for acts or omissions of those individuals under his supervision or control. Furthermore, shareholders, partners, managers, or members should take care to strictly comply with entity formalities to avoid individual liability through piercing of the limited liability veil.

The Supreme Court of Illinois provides forms and guidance with regard to firm registration and annual renewal at the following internet address:https://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Prof_Serv/default.asp (last visited April 28, 2015).

 


 

1 Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 721 allows a firm to organize as any one of the following business forms: a professional corporation (P.C.), a professional association, a limited liability company (LLC), or a registered limited liability partnership (LLP). Limited partnerships (LPs) and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs) are not enumerated in Rule 721, and these business forms are therefore unavailable.

Record Retention Obligations: Acing The Audit

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs(1)
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

 

Lawyers have traditionally created a great deal of paper. The amount of information kept on paper has been reduced as lawyers have been pulled into the electronic era by their more advanced clients. In this new era, the prevalence and sheer amount of electronic data created and received by lawyers can be absolutely overwhelming. Does a lawyer have a responsibility to preserve all this tangible and virtual clutter after a file has been closed? If so, for how long and at what cost? This article addresses the paper and electronic files that must be retained by a firm or small practice for some period of time under the law.

Client Contacts and Attorney Financials.

Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 769, every attorney has a duty to retain certain limited records for a minimum of seven years after the records are created. These records include (1) the name and last known address of each of the attorney’s clients, (2) record of whether the attorney’s representation of that client is ongoing or concluded, and (3) all financial records related to the attorney’s practice. With regard to financial records, Rule 769 specifically requires attorneys to retain bank statements, time and billing records, checks, check stubs, journals, ledgers, audits, financial statements, tax returns and tax reports from the past seven years. The Rule allows an attorney to maintain original, copies, or computer-generated images of these records. However, the Committee Comment to Rule 769 notes that while maintaining required records using certain electronic media, such as CDs and DVDs, may save space and reduce cost without increasing the risk of premature destruction, certain other storage media, such as floppy disks, tapes, hard drives, zip drives, and other magnetic media are not sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 769 because they have normal life spans of less than seven years.

Records of Client Trust Account Funds.

Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct[1] also requires lawyers in Illinois to retain complete records of client trust account funds and any other client property previously safeguarded by an attorney. These records must be retained for a period of seven years after termination of the client’s representation. Like Illinois Supreme Court Rule 769, Rule 1.15(a) allows these records to be maintained in electronic form, but only if printed copies can be produced and the records are readily accessible to the lawyer. Rule 1.15(a) was recently amended in July 2011 to include detailed specifics regarding the types of files that must be retained and the correct procedure for adherence.[2]

Other Records and Files.

Although the record retention procedures required by the rules above should be viewed as mandatory for lawyers practicing in Illinois, they are limited in scope, and there are number of scenarios that these rules do not directly address. The Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois (“ARDC”) provides some limited advice. According to the ARDC, for records not covered under Rule 769 or Rule 1.15,[3] there are no rules that specifically cover how long a lawyer must keep records contained in a client’s file (unless the lawyer has been disciplined and the duties of Supreme Court Rule 764 would apply). Upon termination of the representation, the lawyer is required to return all papers and property received from the client (Rules 1.15(d) and 1.16(d)). For other records, the lawyer should exercise prudent judgment in determining how long to retain the client file, taking into consideration such things as when the statute of limitations for legal malpractice has expired, any particular difficulties in the relationship with the client or the representation, if the client was a minor or incompetent that might extend the period of limitations, whether the file contains any original documents that the client might want back, and whether any documents if destroyed would be difficult to reconstruct from other sources.[4]
The prudent lawyer should always err on the side of caution when deciding whether to destroy client files or records, especially considering the wide availability of reliable, cost-effective electronic file storage options.

[1] For a more detailed discussion regarding compliance with Rule 1.15(a) under a specific set of circumstances, see Illinois State Bar Association Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct No. 01-02 (July 2001) (destruction of client file after client failure to retrieve file with 30 day notice likely failed compliance).
[2] Amended Rule 1.15(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct lays out the exact procedures and types of files that must be retained in painstaking detail. A link to the current version of Rule 1.15(a) can be found at the following internet address: http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/Art_VIII/default_NEW.asp (last visited November 12, 2014).
[3] The ARDC also references Rule 756(e), which requires an attorney to maintain records of malpractice insurance reported to the ARDC as part of the attorney registration process for a period of seven years from the date that coverage is reported.
[4] Attorneys Registration & Disciplinary Commission, Ethics Inquiry Program FAQS, http://www.iardc.org/ethics_faq.html (last visited December 22, 2014).

Don’t Let Cybersecurity Breaches Lead to Legal Malpractice: The Fax Is Back

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs(1)
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

E-mail and wire fraud risks increase in a cloud-based world. Data management safeguards can prevent possible legal malpractice from cyber-security breaches.

It’s cloud’s illusions that I recall
I really don’t know clouds at all…
— Judy Collins

Back in July of 2011, we warned of a then popular e-mail/fraudulent check scheme whereby lawyers would receive e-mails from alleged potential foreign clients looking to collect debts from customers. Those scammers convinced the unsuspecting lawyers to deposit fraudulent “settlement checks” into client accounts and wire the “clients’ share” to foreign accounts after the bogus checks cleared. When the frauds were eventually uncovered by the banks, the lawyers were left with liability to the banks for the fraudulent check and wire transfers.2 Since then, newer, more complex electronic scams have surfaced whereby hackers intercept e-mails between lawyers and clients that contain wire transfer instructions. After intercepting such an e-mail, the hacker changes the instructions in the e-mail to wire money to his own untraceable account. The hacker forwards his bogus wiring instructions to the unsuspecting recipient, all while “masking” his identity as the sender and making it appear to the recipient as if the instruction came from the correct sender, whether lawyer or client.

Attorneys Present a Target for Sophisticated Hackers & Wire Fraud

Depending on your firm’s sophistication and budget, the type of transaction involved, and the needs of your client, there are some preventative measures that can be considered with regard to protecting your firm and your clients from this and other wire transfer and electronic fraud schemes. Prevention techniques can include hiring a third-party e-mail encryption service provider or sending sensitive wire transfer instructions via facsimile rather than e-mail.3

This and other even more sophisticated electronic scams are becoming more prevalent. Given the confidential and valuable information passed between clients and their lawyers due to the attorney-client privilege, lawyers’ and law firms’ computer and e-mail accounts have become favorite targets. Whether an attorney transfers or stores confidential client information using password-protected corporate e-mail systems, “cloud computing,”4 third-party off-site network administrator vendors, third-party hosted e-discovery management platforms, or a variety of other electronic data transfer or data storage solutions available through the Internet, the attorney inevitably faces an inherent risk that confidential client information will be susceptible to theft by a hacker or by an unscrupulous third-party employee. In the absence of reasonable, preventative, and precautionary measures, the lawyer also risks losses for the firm and its clients associated with such a theft.

Understanding how and why lawyers and law firms may be exposed to cybercrime is the first step in prevention. Because of the ever increasing capabilities of cloud computing and, with it, the proliferation of everyday use of mobile devices—such as smartphones, tablets, and laptops—lawyers and law firms put sensitive client material at risk simply by falling asleep on the train home or finishing a brief on the redeye. A misplaced smartphone or briefcase can result in serious consequences if a device ends up in the wrong hands. In addition, mobile devices and both cloud-based and in-firm corporate networks and email systems are susceptible to electronic hacking where a hacker will illegally gain access to electronic information using a variety of more sophisticated methods. Law firms and lawyers present a particularly appealing target for hackers because the mandatory confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship creates a virtual treasure trove of sensitive client information—such as social security numbers, medical information, trade secrets, wire transfer instructions, privileged litigation communications and strategy, and internal corporate strategies—much of which can be very valuable to an array of criminal enterprises.

Professional Obligations of Attorneys in the Cloud

Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) requires a lawyer practicing in Illinois to make reasonable efforts to ensure the confidentiality of client information, including electronically stored client information.5 However, to be competitive in today’s legal services market, lawyers and law firms must utilize the cost-saving and organizational advantages technology allows them to offer recurring and prospective clients. While technology utilization is necessary, the prudent lawyer will also realize that the use of technology to electronically store and transfer sensitive client information necessitates proactive implementation of safeguards that will help in the prevention and defense of this information’s electronic theft. The extent and levels of necessary safeguards will likely be determined by the size of the law firm and its areas of practice, among other considerations. Depending on the specific needs of a firm or solo practitioner, there is a vast selection of cyber security precautions available but every law firm utilizing the technology discussed in this article should at least consider undertaking the following.6

Implement Data Management Safeguards

Every law firm should maintain computer-use policies requiring employees to use and routinely update passwords for e-mail, document management systems, mobile devices, and laptops. Intranets, extranets, and Citrix-like virtual desktops also invariably require password protection. In today’s corporate environments, while all networks and company laptops probably employ anti-virus protection, employees using personal laptops to perform work outside of the office must be required to install similar anti-virus protection. Firm policies should include periodic inspections of mobile devices and personal laptops to ensure that employees do not turn off password and/or anti-virus protection functions out of convenience or technical incompetence. Other safeguards may include limiting who may access particular materials electronically and when they may share, print, or alter data. Finally, every firm’s computer-use policy should communicate to its employees, (1) the seriousness of the firm’s confidentiality obligation to its clients, (2) the very real possibility of a cyber-attack, and (3) the procedure for reporting a potential data breach or suspected disclosure.

Address Firm Data Retention Policies

A law firm likely houses an incredible amount of data through its electronic document management system and its corporate network and e-mail system. It should maintain clear policies regarding the length of time certain types of data will be stored, the strength of security to be maintained for certain stored data, and the procedures for eliminating unnecessary or outdated data. Just as a law firm is routinely required to destroy or shred sensitive hard copy materials, it must have procedures in place to completely remove and destroy sensitive electronic data from firm databases and to destroy unwanted or out of date firm equipment that may have housed sensitive information.

In conclusion, attorneys can and should take the necessary precautions to minimize the likelihood of cyber-security breaches, not only to give their clients peace of mind, but also to better shield themselves from third-party and first-party liabilities if a theft of information or other security breach actually occurs.

 


 

[1]Joe is a shareholder of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., and the chairman of the business litigation/transaction group and co-chair of the employment group. He appreciates Johnson & Bell associate, Brian C. Langs, for his assistance in the drafting of this article.

[2]For the full article, see Joseph R. Marconi and Victor J. Pioli, Lawyers are Increasingly the Targets of Email/Fraudulent Check Schemes, ISBA Mutual Insurance Company Liability Minute, (July 13, 2011 12:46 PM), http://www.isbamutual.com/liability-minute/lawyers-are-increasingly-the-targets-of-emailfraud.

[3]For more detailed information and recommendations regarding protecting your firm and your clients from e-mail interception and other types of check and wire transfer fraud, see Ronald Trubiana, Title Agents and Lawyers: Be Wary and Protect Yourselves, THE TRUSTED ADVISOR, October 2010, http://www.atgf.com/tools-publications/trusted-adviser/check-and-wire-transfer-fraud-growth-industry (last visited July 25, 2014); ALTA Best Practices Frequently Asked Questions: Best Practices #3: Email Encryption, ATTORNEYS’ TITLE GUARANTY FUND, http://www.atgf.com/tools-publications/alta-best-practices-frequently-asked-questions (last vistied July 25, 2014); Ronald Trubiana, Update from ATG Administration: Five Ways to Reduce Exposure to Wire Fraud, THE TRUSTED ADVISOR, April 2010, http://www.atgf.com/tools-publications/trusted-adviser/five-ways-reduce-exposure-wire-fraud (last visited July 25, 2014).

[4]“Cloud computing” can include receiving and sending e-mails on a smartphone or tablet; using a web-based email platform like Gmail, Yahoo! or Microsoft Outlook Web Access; or using products like Google Docs, Microsoft Office 365, Dropbox, SharePoint intranets/extranets, and Citrix Desktop as a Service (“DaaS”). As Formal Opinion 2011-200 of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility aptly remarks, “cloud computing is merely a fancy way of saying stuff’s not on your computer.”

[5]See Ill. State Bar Ass’n Adv. Op. Prof’l. Conduct Nos. 96-10, 10-01; see also State Bar Ariz. Ethics Op. 09-04; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Adv. Op. 842; Mass. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op.12-03; Pa. Bar Ass’n Form. Op. 2011-200 (all discussing substantially similar versions of subsection (a) of IRCP 1.6, entitled “Confidentiality of Information,” and its applicability to a lawyer’s ethical duty to protect electronically stored or transferred confidential client information).

[6]Much of the content below making particular suggestions for precautionary actions by law firms was taken from two excellent articles: Seth L. Laver, Understanding and Protecting Against Cyber Risk, FOR THE DEFENSE (DRI’s Monthly Magazine), July 2012 at 46–49 and Rene L. Siemens and David L. Beck, Cyber Insurance—Mitigating Loss from Cyber Attacks, PERSPECTIVES ON INSURANCE RECOVERY NEWSLETTER, Summer 2012, http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/cyber-insurancemitigating-loss-from-cyber-attacks (last visited July 8, 2014). Both articles are recommended readings that provide detailed discussion of many of the issues raised in this article.

Debt Collectors Beware: Venue Provision of FDCPA Reinterpreted

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs(1)
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

 

Neither a borrower nor a lender be…
— Shakespeare

Recent federal court decision reinterprets the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and may create venue defense for current or future debtor defendants in debt collection suits.

In Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12562 (7th Cir. 2014), the Seventh Circuit recently reinterpreted the venue provision of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The issue for the court was whether township small claims courts in Marion County, Indiana (Indianapolis) constituted separate “judicial districts or similar legal entities” for purposes of section 1692i of the FDCPA. The en banc majority held that debt collectors must file collection actions in the “smallest geographic area that is relevant for determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed.”

Implications for Cook County Lawyers

In doing so, the Seventh Circuit not only overruled its own 1996 precedent in Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 1996), but also applied the en banc Suesz decision retroactively. Debt collectors previously relied on Newsom to file collection actions in a court in the debtor’s county — but not in the township or intra-county small claims court in the area where the debtor resided or where the debtor contract was signed. Per Suesz, for those of us in Cook County, collection lawsuits should be filed in the Municipal District where the debtor resides or where the contract was signed. For lawsuits that are already pending, an immediate motion to transfer to the appropriate Municipal District is most prudent.

Seventh Circuit Debt Collection Decision Will Be Applied Retroactively

In Suesz, a debt collector had filed a collection action against a debtor in the Pike Township of Marion County Small Claims Court, one of nine small claims courts in Marion County. The hospital which was trying to collect debt was located in Marion County. However, the debtor lived in Hancock County and the hospital was located in Lawrence Township, Marion County rather than Pike Township, Marion County. The debtor then filed suit alleging that the debt collector violated section 1692i of the FDCPA because the contract from which the debt arose was not signed in Pike Township, and the debtor did not live there either.

This retroactively applied decision may cause a real problem for debt collectors and debt collecting firms which had relied on Newsom as good law and filed collection actions in a debtor’s home county or the county where the contract was signed, but failed to file in the debtor’s township, municipal district, or other intra-county small claims court or intra-county small claims court where the contract was signed. Those concerned by this ruling should also pay close attention to the case which has been remanded back to the Southern District Court of Indiana (Case No. 1:12-cv-1517) where the debtor plaintiff is likely to again move for class certification.


[1] Joe Marconi is a shareholder of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., the head of the Business Litigation/Transactions group and co-chair of the Employment group. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Johnson & Bell, Ltd. associate, Brian C. Langs, for the research and drafting of this article.

Not Only Shareholders Get Pierced

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs(1)
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

 

Omittance is no quittance.
— Shakespeare

How many lawyers assist a client in forming a corporation, but merely assist in filing the annual reports and do nothing else? Failure to advise of the risk associated with this minimal approach may now more likely result in veil-piercing to reach the client for individual liability.

Illinois courts have long held that the failure to follow corporate procedure may lead to the individual liability of a shareholder, director, or officer. Now, according to a recent case in the Appellate Court for the First District, even a non-shareholder — who is not an officer, director, or employee of a corporation — may be found individually liable for a judgment against a corporation where he exercises only equitable ownership and control over a corporation, even if there were no allegations that he engaged in any wrongdoing in the underlying case.

In John Buckley and Mama Grimm’s Bakery, Inc. v. Haithham Abuzir, 2014 IL App (1st) 130469 (April 10, 2014), a bakery corporation and its individual owner sought to pierce the corporate veil of a pastries corporation to collect a judgment directly from its individual financier and controller. The trial court granted the individual defendant’s motion section 2-615 motion to dismiss because the individual defendant was not a shareholder, director, officer, or employee of the pastries corporation. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal. On appeal, plaintiffs maintained that the defendant made all the business decisions for the pastries corporation and exercised control over it to such a degree that it amounted to a dummy corporation and alter ego of the individual defendant. The individual defendant made two arguments in defense: (1) Illinois courts only pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on a corporation’s shareholders, officers, directors, or employees, and he was none of these; and (2) he was not party to the underlying action and was therefore deprived of the ability to defend himself against the allegations made against the pastries corporation.

With regard to the latter issue, the First District held that if plaintiffs proved defendant was the alter ego of the pastries corporation, the decision not to defend the underlying suit would have been his own, ipso facto. After acknowledging that the courts and commenters around the country were split on the issue of whether the corporate veil may be pierced to reach non-shareholders and/or those individuals lacking a corporate title at all, the Mama Grimm’s court determined that the majority of jurisdictions have held that a defendant’s lack of shares or corporate title does not preclude veil-piercing. Relying on Fontana v. TLD Builders, 362 Ill. App. 3d 491 (2d 2005), the Mama Grimm’s court further stated that Illinois falls in line with that majority and held that equitable ownership as pleaded by Mama Grimm’s may satisfy the unity-of-interest-and-ownership prong for piercing the corporate the veil, regardless of whether an individual is a non-shareholder or lacks any other formal title within the corporation.

This case clarifies a previously muddy area of Illinois law and requires that closely held corporations undertake every effort to maintain the corporate form. Lawyers should stress to their clients the importance of adequate capitalization, issuance of stock, election of a board of directors, recording of meeting minutes, and other corporate formalities. The simple formation of a corporation is not enough for individual clients to avoid personal liability, even if the individual is not a shareholder, director, or officer of the corporation.

 


[1] Joe Marconi is a shareholder of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., the head of the Business Litigation/Transactions group and co-chair of the Employment group. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Johnson & Bell, Ltd. associate, Brian C. Langs, for the research and drafting of this article.

Illinois’ Limited Liability is Unlimited

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs(1)
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

In a case of first impression, a First District Panel of the Appellate Court of Illinois issued an opinion confirming immunity from liability arising from fraud under the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act (“LLC Act”) (805 ILCS 180/10-10). Careful lawyers must consider the Illinois law before forming an LLC in another state. In Dass v. Yale, 2013 IL App (1st) 122520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013), the Court firmly established that a member’s personal immunity for “debts, obligations, and liabilities … whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise” includes immunity for acts of fraud committed while acting as a member of the LLC.

In doing so, the Court rejected the exceptions to member manager immunity found in the model Uniform Limited Liability Company Act’s (1996) (“Uniform Act”) commentary, which excludes from the Uniform Act’s “safe harbor” liability “on account of the member’s or manager’s own conduct.” It found that the Illinois LLC Act has no such exception, even in a case where the member manager commits fraud. This is a material advantage to member managers who form their LLCs in Illinois — and raises the possibility that malpractice claims might arise when an LLC doing business in Illinois is formed in a state that instead follows the Uniform Act.2

In Dass, plaintiffs filed their fifth amended complaint before being dismissed on a 2-619(a)(5) and (a)(9) motion based, in part, on the immunity provisions of the LLC Act.3 There, plaintiffs were a married couple who purchased a rehabbed condominium from developer Wolcott, LLC (“Wolcott”), of which defendant Yale was the sole member and manager. After moving in, plaintiffs suffered flooding from the unit’s sewage system and later inspection showed that numerous representations by the seller were fraudulently false — both as to the existing condition of the sewage system and promises to reconfigure it. Specifically, Yale signed a fraudulent property report with full knowledge that the condition of the sewer system was not as represented and that Yale knowingly made false promises to have competent, licensed work done on it.4 His signature was made “as manager” of Wolcott.

Importantly, plaintiffs did not plead that Yale’s fraud was committed outside of his role as member/manager of Wolcott; nor did they plead to pierce the corporate veil. Instead, plaintiffs held to the theory that Section 10-10 of the Act simply did not extend a limitation upon liability to acts of fraud committed by a manager in the course of doing company business. They relied on a comparison with the Uniform Act which, unlike the LLC Act, contained a comment to the effect that personal liability could attach to a member manager if his alleged wrongful acts would have resulted in liability to him had he acted in an individual capacity. See, Uniform Act, Sect. 303 Comment.

Both the trial court and the appellate court soundly rejected that theory. Both courts looked no further than the plain language of the immunity section, which reads: “the debts, obligations, and liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, are solely the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the company. A member or manager is not personally liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager.” 5

The courts rejected application of the Uniform Act’s limiting commentary, noting that the Illinois legislature did not expressly adopt that language and that the “historical and statutory notes” are not part of the LLC Act but merely added by West, the publisher of the annotated statutes. It further noted that a 1998 amendment to the LLC Act removed limiting language to the immunity, which had imposed liability on LLC managers “to the extent that a director of a … corporation is liable in analogous circumstances under Illinois law.” Taken together with earlier cases which found LLC members’ immunity with regard to unformed and dissolved LLC’s, the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.

The Court did, however, stress that no effort was made to plead a piercing of the corporate veil or to allege that Yale acted outside of his capacity as member manager. Such allegations, if factually supported, should be de rigueur whenever a plaintiff seeks to attach personal liability to an LLC member/manager for an LLC formed under Illinois law.

The flip side to that is that the standard of care for attorneys who form LLCs for their clients requires that they take advantage of the breadth of Illinois immunity for member managers. Formation of the LLC under the laws of a state following the Uniform Act leaves the member managers exposed to personal liability not only for fraud but for a host of claims arising from the member managers’ “own conduct” — including defamation and exceeding agency authority. Such claims might in turn give rise to malpractice claims against the attorney — for which there is no ready “safe harbor.”

 


 

[1] Joe Marconi is a shareholder of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., the head of the Business Litigation/Transactions group and co-chair of the Employment group. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Johnson & Bell, Ltd. paralegal, Mike Castellaneta, for the research and drafting of this article.

[2] Currently, the Uniform Act is the law in ten states, including California, and is pending in South Carolina.

[3] Because Yale’s alleged fraud extended to concealing his identity from the plaintiffs, he was not named until the plaintiffs’ fifth amended complaint. The court’s ruling regarding a statute of limitations defense under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.) is not treated here.

[4] Yale was also alleged to have fraudulently concealed his identity as the manager of Wolcott, using another individual as a front — fraud in the concealment of the wrongdoing which was directly relevant to the statute of limitations defense.

[5] Unless, per subsection (d), the articles of incorporation provide differently and the manager has consented to liability exposure.

 

’Til Death Do Us Impart

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs(1)
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

 

Estate planning often involves multiple professionals who must exchange confidential information regarding their clients’ affairs. The Illinois Court of Appeals provides an insightful opinion regarding when such privileges terminate, who can waive them after the client’s death, and what actions, if any, would put confidential information “at issue” and thus make discoverable.

When an estate planning client dies, the attorney client privilege continues to bind the attorney regarding communications with third parties, just as it did while the client lived. What does change upon the death of a client, however, is the status of that client’s agents — such as accountants, financial advisers, bankers and others who, prior to the client’s death, were privy to confidential communications without resulting in a waiver of the privilege. Because the death of the principal ends the agency relationship, post death communications to such agents become discoverable to third parties.

The Illinois First District Court of Appeals recently examined the effect of the client’s death on privilege claims in Adler v. Greenfield, 2013 IL App (1st) 121066; 2013 Ill. App. LEXIS 323 (1st Dist. May 24, 2013). In Adler an estate planning law firm was sued for malpractice by disappointed third party beneficiaries alleging that the intentions of the testator were not followed to their detriment.

Plaintiffs (beneficiaries) sought both pre and post death communications between the decedents, the law firm, and a bank that assisted the decedents in estate planning. The document requests included direct communications between the attorney and the bank, both before and after the decedents’ death, and between the bank and the decedents. The law firm and the bank both refused to turn over the communications, asserting attorney client privilege. After a lengthy exchange of motions to compel and reconsider, the law firm ultimately refused to turn over a limited number of documents despite a discovery order to do so and requested the imposition of a nominal monetary contempt sanction to permit an appeal. The trial court obliged, and the Court of Appeals reviewed the matter de novo.2

Specifically, the firm withheld 22 documents that were communications with the bank; the bank itself produced five of these, leaving 17 attorney-bank communications at issue. The court’s inquiry centered on the role of the bank as an agent for the decedents — a status that conveyed attorney client privilege protection to its communications with counsel, and which removed the “third party” status that would have otherwise waived the privilege claim. The bank assisted the decedents in formulating an estate plan and eventually became co-executor and co-trustee. Ultimately, the court determined that prior to the decedents’ death, the bank was acting as decedents’ agent, thus bringing communications with their attorney within the privilege. The pre-death communications directly concerned instructions and concerns of the clients expressed through the bank relative to their estate planning. Many began with a clarifying statement, such as, “As you may know [bank] has been assisting [decedents] with their investments … .”

However, after the decedents’ death, that agency relationship terminated, the result being that post-death communications by the attorney to the bank were unprivileged communications with a third party. “[U]nder agency principles, the death of the principal terminates the authority of the agent.” Id. at 1233.

Having found that such pre-death communications fell within the attorney client privilege, the court then examined whether that privilege was somehow waived. Two grounds were offered — that plaintiffs, as successor co-trustees and co-executors of the estate, were the holder of the privilege and could therefor waive it; and, that the attorney’s conduct in representing the estate was at issue in the case. Id. at 1234.

As to the holder of the privilege issue, the court noted that the privilege survives the death of the client. “The only context in which a client’s death might affect the viability of the privilege is a will contest … [because] a decedent would (if one could ask him) waive the privilege in order that the distribution scheme he actually intended be put into effect.” Id. at 1234 [citing Hitt v. Stephens, 285 Ill.App.3d 713, 717-718 (4th Dist. 1996)]. In this case, the issue of which will to enter into probate had been previously determined in another venue, leaving only malpractice claims, “brought by beneficiaries in their individual capacities against [attorney] … [the] estate was not even a party to the action.” Id. at 1235. Indeed, the estate itself suffered no damages, but only the beneficiaries, thus plaintiffs’ status as co-trustee would not have conveyed standing to pursue the malpractice claim in any case. Id. at 1235.

Importantly, as to the argument that the attorney’s representation continued with respect to the decedents’ estate so that the co-trustees now controlled the privilege, the plaintiff “offered no case law and we have discovered none, that would permit a trustee to assert or waive a decedents’ privilege outside the context of a will contest.” Id. at 1235.

With regard to the claim that the attorney’s performance is “at issue”, the court noted that the privilege does not belong to the attorney but to the client. Therefore the attorney may not “waive” the privilege due to his or her own conduct. It is, rather, the client who, by virtue of pleading, puts privileged information “at issue” such as by alleging the time of discovering an injury in the context of the statute of limitations issue.3 Given the analysis in those precedents, “it is the client, not the attorney, that places the attorney’s advice at issue for the purposes of waiving the privilege. Accordingly, we cannot find that [attorney] waived the privilege by placing his conduct at issue.” Id. at 1236.

The lessons of Adler are relatively clear. Most importantly:

  • Attorney communications with a client’s agent cease to be privileged upon the death of the client, thus negating the privilege for subsequent disclosures;
  • Clearly communicating the context and purpose of communicating with a third party to establish agency is beneficial to establish privilege claims;
  • The remaining privilege is not controlled by the beneficiaries or the executor/trustees of the estate except in the sole context of a will contest;
  • No action by the attorney, nor any issue raised by anyone but the actual client, can put privileged material “at issue” and thus subject to disclosure.
  • The importance of understanding bullet point one cannot be overemphasized. Once your client has joined the Choir Invisible, anything you disclose to anyone outside your office, including, but not limited to, your client’s own agents, relatives, executors, administrators, bankers, accountants or other associates is no longer privileged and is entirely discoverable as a result. While it is true that “dead men tell no tales” — the dead man’s agents may well be compelled to.

The Contractual Arbitration Limitation Period for Uninsured Motorist Insurance Policies

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs(1)
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

 

Even neophyte attorneys understand that their clients’ actions can be barred if they miss a statutory limitations period. However, experienced attorneys may forget that when handling claims against insurance companies under their clients’ uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage a contractual two-year limitation(2) will trump any longer statutory period. Failure to adhere to the two-year limitation period will terminate a claim as surely as a blown statute.

The Illinois Insurance Code (“Insurance Code”) (215 ILCS 5/1 et seq.) requires two provisions for all auto insurance policies issued in the state: uninsured or underinsured insurance coverage (”UM/UIM”) and a mandatory arbitration provision with respect to “any dispute with respect to coverage and the amount of damages …” 215 ILCS 5/143a. Practitioners need to realize that as a result, UM/UIM policies typically contain within them a contractual two-year limitations period for demanding arbitration of any claim against their clients’ UM/UIM carrier.

UM/UIM policies issued in Illinois typically have a two-year contractual limitation on making an arbitration demand. An example of such a clause may read, “No suit, action or arbitration proceedings for recovery of any claim may be brought against us until the insured has fully complied with all the terms of this policy. Further, any suit, action or arbitration will be barred unless commenced within two-years from the date of the accident.” Country Preferred Ins. Co. v. Whitehead, 2012 IL 113365, P5 (Ill. 2012). Thus, when a dispute with the carrier arises, the insured is obligated both to have complied with the notice and cooperation requirements of the UM/UIM policy and to file any claim against the carrier within the limitations period. Because parties are limited to arbitration as the means of resolving UM/UIM disputes, the arbitration limit is effectively a statute of limitations on claims under the policy.

This two-year contractual limitation substantially shortens the statutory ten-year limit for claims on a written contract that would otherwise apply.3 735 ILCS 5/13-206; Country Preferred Ins. Co., 2012 IL 113365, P29. Contractually shortened statutory limits do not violate public policy if the shortened period is still “reasonable” and the limitation is stated in specific and clear provisions. Zerjal v. Daech & Bauer Construction, Inc., 405 Ill. App. 3d 907, 915 (5th Dist. 2010).

Consequently, when challenged on public policy grounds, the courts have uniformly found that the two-year contractual limitations period in UM/UIM policies is enforceable. Rein v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 407 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973 (1st Dist. 2011) (“We find no authority … that the two-year limitations provision in State Farm’s policy itself contravenes public policy.”).

As a best practice, all counsel are advised to protect their clients by submitting an arbitration demand, consistent with the terms of the policy, as soon as practicable. This should be done even if counsel does not yet know of or anticipate any claim under the UM/UIM policy. In this case, prevention is the only cure.


[1] Joe acknowledges the assistance of Johnson & Bell, Ltd. paralegal Mike Castellaneta, J.D., in preparing this note.

[2] The author uses a two-year limitations period as an exemplar of a common policy provision. Although two-year limitations periods are common in uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, the practitioner should be aware that it is not uncommon for a policy to have a different limitations period. The practitioner should obtain a copy of the relevant policy and review the applicable contractual limitations period.

[2] The practitioner should note that the two-year contractual limitation period discussed in this article has two separate requirements. First, the claimant must commence a claim for arbitration within two years. Second, the claimant must file suit against the insurer within two years. However, the deadline by which the claimant must file suit against the insurer will be tolled where the claimant has commenced the arbitration process in a proper and timely manner. 215 ILCS 5/143.1 (“Whenever any policy or contract for insurance … contains a provision limiting the period within which the insured may bring suit, the running of such period is tolled from the date proof of loss is filed, in whatever form is required by the policy, until the date the claim is denied in whole or in part.”)

The Incredible Shrinking Limitations Period

By Joseph R. Marconi & Brian C. Langs(1)
Johnson & Bell, Ltd.
Chicago 

 

Claims involving special defendants, such as municipalities, mass transit companies, school and port districts, are subject to a special one year limitations period. Certain claimants, including policemen, firemen, and guardsmen, must make claims for death benefits within a year of death. In some cases, a special notice requirement is also imposed, as early as six months from the triggering event. This article reviews the main instances of these special limitations periods.

One of the cardinal rules of malpractice avoidance is to always be cognizant of any statute of limitations that applies to your clients’ potential actions and to timely file their claims.

Typically, the first place to check is Article 8 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-101 through 225). Yet, the applicable statute of limitations may change depending on the nature of the parties involved, so what might otherwise be a two, four, or even five year limitation shrinks into a one year statute.2 This applies to such parties as schools, harbor and sanitary districts, mass transit companies, police, fire, National Guard personnel, and state employees. In some cases, a six month notice requirement overlays the statute of limitations, so that a failure to provide a factual statement within that time bars the action. A private right of action arising under any particular statute may, and very likely does, contain its own limitations provision and must be noted as soon as possible.

This article is not offered as a complete guide to limitation statutes of one year or less — there are many short limitations period associated with statutory-based administrative and regulatory claims. Rather, we refer to statutes that overlay a special one year limitation (or less) on claims that might otherwise have a longer period under Article 8. This list is not necessarily exhaustive and counsel is urged to habituate review of all possible limitation statutes to determine applicability.

MASS TRANSIT

70 ILCS 3605/41; 70 ILCS 3615/5.03
Under both the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act and the Regional Transit Authority Act, “No civil action shall be commenced in any court against the Authority by any person … for any injury to [his] person unless it commenced within one year from the date [that] the cause of action accrued.”

CIVIL IMMUNITIES ACT

Under the Civil Immunities Chapter of the Illinois Code (745 ILCS 5/0.01 through 80/1), in addition to establishing immunities for various entities and situations, there are special limitations and notice requirements for claims against various entities, principally governments, schools and their employees.

Municipalities

745 ILCS 10/8-101
With some exceptions, such as breach of contract actions and some employment disputes, claims against “a local entity or its employees [except regarding medical care]” must be filed within one year of the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.

School Districts

745 ILCS 25/2
“No civil action shall be commenced in any court against any school district or non-profit private school by any person for any injury to his person or property unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.” 745 ILCS 25/2.

There is also a notice requirement. “Within six months from the date that such injury was received or such cause of action accrued, any person who is about to commence any civil action in any court against any school district for damages on account of any injury to his person or property shall file … a [signed] statement giving [basic information regarding the claim].” 745 ILCS 25/3.3

County Engineers and Highway Superintendents

745 ILCS 15/2
Likewise, claims from injuries arising from a county engineer or highway superintendent must be filed within one year. 745 ILCS 15/2. As with schools, there is a six month notice requirement to provide a signed statement giving basic information regarding the claim. 745 ILCS 15/3, 4.

COURT OF CLAIMS

705 ILCS 505/22
The Illinois Court of Claims handles claims for money damages or personal injury against state agencies or employees including state universities; it also awards compensation to victims of violent crimes under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, and to dependents of police officers, firefighters, National Guard members and state employees killed in the line of duty. There are several Illinois statutes which vest the Court of Claims with jurisdiction4, and cross referencing between those acts and the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505 et seq.) is essential to avoiding blowing either the statute or special notice requirements.

Section 505/22 specifies the limitations period for claims involving various persons or provisions of the Illinois Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505 et seq.) In subsections (b), (d), (e) and (f), the statute specifies a one year limitation for claims. These special categories include claims of:

    • contractual obligations to vendors of goods and services to the state under the “Illinois Public Aid Code” (305 ILCS 5/11-13);5
    • compensation to crime victims under the “Crime Victim’s Compensation Act” (740 ILCS 45/1 et. seq.);6
    • duty death benefits claimed by police officers and firemen and some others under the “Line of Duty Compensation Act” starting on the date of death (820 ILCS 315/1 et seq.); and
    • duty death benefits claimed by Illinois guardsmen and militiamen under the “Illinois National Guardsman’s Compensation Act” (20 ILCS 1825/1 et seq.) starting on the date of death.
    • Under the Line of Duty Compensation Act, there is also a special notice requirement to provide information that must be filed within the same time claim, one year from the date of death. 820 ILCS 315/4.

Subsection 22-1 has a one year notice requirement for claims against Illinois state universities and academic institutions and their boards of trustees. The statement with specified information must be served on the Attorney General and the Clerk of the Court of Claims.7 705 ILCS 505/22-1.

ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE RELATED TO PROBATE

    • 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3

 

    • An even more drastic curtailment of the standard limitations period occurs with respect to some malpractice claims against attorneys pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(d), which reads:

When the injury caused by the act or omission does not occur until the death of the person for whom the professional services were rendered, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the date of the person’s death unless letters of office are issued or the person’s will is admitted to probate within that 2 year period, in which case the action must be commenced within the time for filing claims against the estate or a petition contesting the validity of the will of the deceased person, whichever is later, as provided in the Probate Act of 1975 [755 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq.].

This provision raises two separate issues requiring case by case analysis. First, the attorney must determine whether the injury occurred before or after death. Typically, “injury” caused by improperly drafted testamentary documents will be deemed to have not occurred until death but the case by case analysis can become quite complex in common fact scenarios. Consequently, that determination has fertilized many an appellate decision and attorneys are advised to carefully analyze the basis of their claims to ensure they comply with the proper limitations period.8

Second, if the “until the death” provision applies and letters of office have issued or the will has been admitted to probate, reference must be made to the two triggering events and resulting six-month limitations period set out in the Probate Act of 1975. The possible triggering events: if there is a will filed with the Probate Court, parties have six months to challenge it starting from the date of filing. 755 ILCS 5/8-1(a); alternatively, 755 ILCS 5/18-3 requires that the estate administrator establish a claims period for known and unknown creditors by publishing a notice of death and a termination date for claims against the estate.9 That period can be no less than six months from the date of publication. 755 ILCS 5/18-3.

So, in these circumstances, determining the correct limitations period requires this multi-step analysis: 1) was there no injury “until the death” of the decedent?; 2) was a will filed and if so, on what date?; 3) was a death notice published and, if so, what end date is specified? Because the malpractice limitation is determined by the later of these dates, probate attorneys are best protected by publishing the death notice and filing the will, if any, as soon as possible to start the six months period running.

PORT DISTRICTS

    • 70 ILCS 1805/34; 70 ILCS 1815/44; 70 ILCS 1830/45; 70 ILCS 1870/34

 

    • Port Districts are “quasi-government agencies” that include multiple counties and municipalities, which liaison with local, state and federal agencies to coordinate economic development. Out of 20 port districts established by separate statutes in Illinois, only four Illinois port districts have special limitations statutes of one year. See, 70 ILCS 1800 et seq. Those four are the Havana Regional Port District; the Illinois Valley Regional Port District; the Kaskaskia Regional Port District; and the White County Port District. In addition to the one year statute of limitations, there is a six month notice requirement:

Within 6 months from the date that any injury was received or such cause of action accrued, any person is about to commence any civil action in any court against the Port District for damages on account of any injury to his person shall file in the office of the secretary of the Board … a statement in writing signed by himself, his agent or attorney, giving [basic information regarding the claim].

70 ILCS 1805/34; 70 ILCS 1815/44; 70 ILCS 1830/45; 70 ILCS 1870/34.

SANITARY DISTRICTS:

    • 70 ILCS 2405/22a.47; 70 ILCS 2805/85

 

    • Sanitary districts are taxing authorities that manage sewage and drainage infrastructure. Claims arising from property damage caused by constructing district improvements or failing to install approved improvements must be filed within one year.

COAL MINERS

    • 225 ILCS 705/10.07

 

Claims under the Illinois Coal Mining Act for death or injury must be brought within a year.

As noted above, this article is not meant to be exhaustive — limitations and notice periods overlay and shorten otherwise applicable limitations set forth in Article 8 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure in any specialized or statutorily based claim.10 The purpose of this article was to alert practitioners to this potential source of malpractice and highlight some of the more common claims which would be affected by one year overriding limitation statutes.


[1] Mr. Marconi is a shareholder at Johnson & Bell, Ltd., chairman of the business litigation/transaction group, and co-chair of the employment group. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Justin H. Volmert in drafting this article.

[2] Most one year statutes depend on the status of one or both parties. Few common actions have one year statutes, the main exceptions being slander, defamation and publications violating the right of privacy (735 ILCS 5/13-201); dram shop claims (235 ILCS 5/6-21); and breach of promise to marry — which has a three month notice requirement (740 ILCS 15/6).

[3] The practitioner is urged to review the opinion in Cleary v. Catholic Diocese, 57 Ill. 2d 384 (1974), in which the court held that both the notice and limitation provisions of this Act were invalid as to both public and nonprofit private schools.

[4] These include the Public Aid Act (305 ILCS 5/11 et seq.), the Line of Duty Compensation Act (820 ILCS 315/3); and the Illinois National Guardsman’s Compensation Act (20 ILCS 1825/1 et seq.).

[5] The starting event of this subsection of claims is governed by § 305 ILCS 5/11-13 and can vary depending on the circumstances of the performance, billing and notifications to the state.

[6] Within 2 years of the occurrence of the crime, or within one year after a criminal charge of a person for an offense. (740 ILCS 45-6.1 effective January 1, 2013).

[7] This requirement is obviated if an actual claim was filed within a year.

[8] Likewise, the method of counting the days is important, in terms of whether to count the date of the triggering event (when the claim arises or is discovered, depending on the statute) or the first day after. See 5 ILCS 70/1-11; and 715 ILCS 5/6. For those who, by habit or circumstances, cut it close, it would be beneficial to study the relevant case law. For a start, see J. Marconi and D. Macksey, “WHAT CAN YOU COUNT ON THESE DAYS?” [date][link]

[9] Service of known creditors must be direct and can limit the claims period to three months; however, since the publication of a death notice and resulting minimum six months period is always required, the three month claim limitation is not relevant to the determination of the limitations period under 735 ILCS 214.3(d).

[10] Such as petitioning for the disconnection of a land parcel from a newly-organized municipality. 65 1LCS 5/7-3-1.

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